An unfortunate historical precedent

I'm a little surprised that the learned commentators so abundant in the national press and blogosphere do not make more of the rather obvious historical parallels between the American situation in Iraq and the German catastrophe in Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43. See if any of this sounds familiar: "The German high command urged Hitler to allow Paulus and his forces to break out of the encirclement and rejoin the main German forces west of the city, but Hitler would not contemplate a retreat from the Volga River and ordered Paulus to 'stand and fight.' With winter setting in and food and medical supplies dwindling, Paulus' forces grew weaker. In mid-December Hitler allowed one of the most talented German commanders, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, to form a special army corps to rescue Paulus' forces by fighting its way eastward, but Hitler refused to let Paulus fight his way westward at the same time in order to link up with Manstein. This fatal decision doomed Paulus' forces, since the main German forces now simply lacked the reserves needed to break through the Soviet encirclement singlehandedly. Hitler exhorted the trapped German forces to fight to the death, but on Jan. 31, 1943, Paulus surrendered; 91,000 frozen, starving men (all that was left of the 6th and 4th armies) and 24 generals surrendered with him."
[from the Enclyopedia Brittanica article on the Battle of Stalingrad.]

The invasion of the Soviet Union, of course, was Hitler's original fatal decision. He compounded his mistake through obstinate refusal to come to terms with the extent of the catastrophe. The 91,000 Wehrmacht soldiers which Paulus delivered into captivity were the remnants of a 250,000 man army which undertook the siege of Stalingrad. During the bitter winter of 1942-43, most died of disease and cold. Of those who became POWs, only a small fraction ever made it back to Germany after the war.

Hitler had his own "surge" led by Field Marshal von Manstein, as a last-ditch effort to rescue Petraeus from annihilation. Excuse me, General Paulus. Hitler would not countenance, let alone permit, the more obvious solution of Paulus's "fighting retreat," the favored approach of "generals on the ground," you could say. Paulus wanted to save the men under his command; Hitler was interested only in his self image. The surge failed because the Soviets had been allowed to establish tactical and numerical superiority by the time Hitler reacted, as Der Fuhrer committed error upon error. And underlying it all was his inability to deal psychologically with the devastation he had wrought with his terrible miscalculation. With the destruction of the Wehrmacht in the Eastern Theatre, World War II was effectively over, and so were Hitler's dreams of a thousand year Reich.

As Justin Frank, M.D., Bush's unsolicited psychoanalyst, has diagnosed, Bush's psychological profile is that of a megalomaniac with elements of paranoid ideation. No doubt much of this same profile could be attached to the former German leader, or to Napoleon, or to Louis XIV and his "l'etat c'est moi" perspective. These are extremely dangerous qualities in a national leader, particularly one armed to the teeth with thermonuclear weapons. We can rest assured that Bush will never change course in Iraq because he is psychologically incapable of doing so. The Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, are afraid to impeach him, and most of them lack Bush's unconscionable willingness to leave the military on the field of battle whether or not the funds are there to support them.

My own sense is that we'll be lucky to get to January 20, 2009, without Bush committing one of two horrendous acts. The initiation of a nuclear war, using Iran as the starting point and justification; or the invocation of martial law under the recently revised Insurrection Act, another gift from a complacent Congress. I hope we get lucky and he leaves quietly. Leaving Iraq for another President to clean up is not the worst thing that could happen to us.